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Summary 
 
 
 In this paper we analyzed the social attributes and political ex-
perience of the members of the Croatian Parliament in five mandates. 
We established that the multiparty parliament, during the 18 years of 
its existence, was dominated by men, averagely between 47 and 49 
years of age, Croats, Catholics, highly educated, predominantly in the 
social sciences and humanities, and politicians with significant mana-
gerial and political experience acquired primarily during their work in 
political parties. Furthermore, we found a relatively large fluctuation 
of parliamentarians, resulting in a lower level of parliamentary ex-
perience and a relatively short parliamentary career. Based on these 
indicators, it can be stated that in Croatia a socially homogenous par-
liamentary elite was formed, one with a potentially lower level of po-
litical competence, and that patterns of political recruitment, coherent 
in tendency with those in the developed democratic countries, were 
established. 
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Introduction 
 In order to understand the process of transition and consolidation of the 
so-called new democracies, it is necessary to analyse the functioning of the 
parliament as a “symbol of the people’s representation in politics” (Olson, 
1994: 1). Furthermore, one cannot comprehend the functioning of this high-
est body of representative power through mere institutional analysis, because 
parliamentary work greatly depends on the parliament’s human resources 
(Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998). The human resource dimension of the par-
liament is determined by the parliamentarians’ social and socio-political at-
tributes, which also indicate their potential (in)competence to act as repre-
sentatives of the people, political decision-makers and principal legislators. 
 Parliament members are part of the so-called status political elite (Adam, 
Tomšič, 2002) – which also includes executives and leaders of political par-
ties (primarily, the ones in the parliament) – whose role involves not only 
policy- and decision-making, but also political socialization and mobiliza-
tion of citizens. The latter role of the political elite is especially important in 
countries without a respectable democratic tradition, e.g. the former socialist 
countries, including Croatia. In scientific discussions about the formation 
and role of new political elites, the theory of circulation and the theory of re-
production are predominant, and the results of empirical research confirm 
the value of both (Higley/Pakulski, 1995; Szelenyi/Szelenyi, 1995; Lane, 
1997; Adam/Tomšič, 2002). It was established through comparative research 
that the so-called transitional political elites were partly recruited from the 
former socialist nomenclature, and partly from the classes and groups such 
as bureaucrats and professionals with a certain amount of power in the so-
cialist order, opponents of the former regime (ranging from those who re-
mained undercover to dissidents), and members of the “new class” of social 
dignitaries, managers and owners. Analyses have also determined that the 
transitional political elites share a number of characteristics in addition to the 
sources of recruitment, namely inaccessibility and unaccountability towards 
the citizens, lack of professionalism, a tendency to monopolize politics and 
establish control over the entire social life, unity in the protection of their 
“caste” interests and privileges, as well as a predatory competitiveness in the 
struggle for control over the crucial social resources, often through estab-
lishing clientelistic relationships (Lane, 1997; Higley/Pakulski/Weslowski, 
1998; Adam/Tomšič, 2002). Thus, it is not unexpected that the comparative 
research conducted so far indicates that neither the parliaments nor the gov-
ernments of post-socialist countries have been up to the complex tasks of 
thorough transformation of society and of the political system. They were 
“caught in a paradox between possibility and ability, with great possibilities, 
but small ability to act accordingly” (Olson, 2006: 193). On the one hand, 
this situation did not favor the necessary training of political elites, but on 
the other, it presented a real challenge to those of their members who man-
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aged to capitalize on the collective incapability for their own personal gain 
(be it material or status-related). 
 With regard to the parliament as the highest body of representation con-
stituted on the basis of electoral results – with legislation, control and ad-
vising as its key functions – one of its essential tasks, “not prescribed” by le-
gal acts, is to recruit and socialize the political elite (Silk, 1987; Norton, 
1990; Olson, 1994; Butler, 1995; Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998). Since the 
executive political positions at the national level are the most powerful, it is 
precisely the parliaments that provide the political arena in which candidates 
for those positions originate and where they fight for the support of political 
selectors and citizens. This applies in particular to so-called debating parlia-
ments, which include, inter alia, the Croatian Parliament. Naturally, this is 
also valid for politicians who do not look upon their parliamentary career as 
the apex of their overall political career, and the analyses conducted so far 
indicate that most members of the parliament who have chosen politics as 
their profession cherish the ambition, surreptitiously or openly, of switching 
to the executive level (Norton, 1990; Madgwick, 1994; Hague/Harrop/Bre-
slin, 1998). 
 Irrespective of the previously mentioned critical insights, new democra-
cies also perceive the political elite as the part of society authorized to make 
binding political decisions, and one that comes to power through electoral 
success in the process of political competition, whereby political parties as-
sume the role of principal selectors (Higley/Pakulski, 1995). The fact that 
political parties are the key arbiter in the election process actually means that 
“the voters decide on the number of mandates some parties will get, and the 
parties decide on who will receive those mandates” (Kasapović, 2001a: 4). 
In this context, it is particularly important how the candidate-selection pro-
cedures in political parties are conducted, especially in those that are not yet 
fully profiled and organized. As for Croatia, an analysis of the regulation of 
the candidate-selection procedure in legal acts and statutes of political par-
ties indicated that a “total party monopoly over the said procedure is legal-
ized”, and that “the Croatian political parties, generally speaking, conduct 
these procedures in a very centralized, exclusive and non-democratic 
way”.This means: 1) that party candidates for parliamentary elections are 
selected exclusively at the national level (with the decisive influence of the 
party president and the highest bodies), 2) that the manner of deciding on the 
candidates – characterized by the practice in which party leaderships con-
sisting of representatives and state officials also nominate candidates for 
electoral lists without carrying out the preliminary party elections as “a more 
participative form of candidate selection” – institutionalizes the “pattern of 
self-reproduction and self-promotion of party political elites”, and, 3) that 
party candidates are “selected and appointed, not elected” (Kasapović, 
2001a: 13-16). Consequently, the social structure of the parliament depends 
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primarily on party personnel policy and the criteria determined by party el-
ites when putting together electoral lists. 
 The political parties are able not only to determine which candidates will 
be favored in the electoral process, but also to influence the activity of the 
selected candidate. To be more specific, since the winning candidate owes 
his/her election primarily to the party which put forward his/her candidature, 
he/she is expected to follow the dictate of that party in his/her parliamentary 
work (Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998). So, there is a real danger of parliamen-
tary representatives performing their duty predominantly as representatives 
of the interests of their party, and disregarding the interests of social groups 
or electoral units they are actually supposed to represent. At the same time, 
there is an opposite danger of representatives showing particular respect to 
the interests of certain social and interest groups or regions, and neglecting 
the national interests and problems. Aside from the said factors, the work of 
parliament members can be affected by their personal political or profes-
sional ambitions, and by the perception of their own role in the body they 
were elected in. All the mentioned elements can place parliament members 
in a conflict of roles, which is why they must construct their own “interpre-
tation of representation and harmonize the demands of the country, party, 
electorate – and their own conscience” (Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998: 191). 
 
Some Characteristics of the Development of Croatian 
Parliamentarism 
 The analyses conducted so far indicate that the Croatian parliamentary 
system was developed in relatively unfavorable and unstable conditions. The 
reason for this is not only the war (1991-1995), nor the institutional reform-
ism, hyper-electoralism, and the slow consolidation of political parties and 
the party system, but also the pronounced ideological and symbolic division 
and fragmentation of interests in the Croatian society, which was also re-
flected in the activity of political protagonists in the Croatian Parliament 
(Kasapović, 1996, 2001; Ilišin, 2001; Lalović, 2001; Zakošek, 2002).1 The 
subordination of the parliament to the executive power – initially the Presi-
dent of the Republic, and since 2000, the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia – contributed significantly to its political marginalization. At the 
 
1 D. Lalović (2001: 21) used the example of the opposition in the fourth legislative mandate 
of the Parliament (notably, HDZ, which focused on the populist mobilization of different dis-
satisfied protagonists in Croatian society) to demonstrate that a lack of “opposition capable of 
control”, which could play its role within the given constitutional and parliamentary rules of the 
game, blocks the functioning of the highest institution of representative power. Consequently, 
the Parliament did not even manage to become “the place of formation of the common will of 
political parties, let alone the general will of Croatian citizens”. 
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same time, the Croatian Parliament was burdened by an exaggerated sym-
bolic significance, being perceived as “the primary institutional bearer of in-
dependent political life” and “a part of the Croatian state and legislative tra-
dition” (Zakošek, 2002: 97).2 In addition to the mythologized past of the Par-
liament, the harsh parliamentary present was also blurred by its functioning 
in the phase of constitution of a political order. Namely, the Croatian Par-
liament in its transitional beginnings – similar to the parliaments of other 
post-socialist states – was rather a “source of introduction and celebration of 
the change of political system, than a source of implementation of law” (Ol-
son, 2006: 193). In other words, it seems that the Parliament’s existing sym-
bolic charge and the celebration of its importance were not strong enough to 
override the dominance of the executive power over the legislative power. 
 The mentioned unstable conditions for the development of the Croatian 
parliamentary system, and hence for the formation of parliamentary elite, 
can be illustrated with additional facts and data: 
• from 1990 to the end of 2007, six parliamentary elections were held; the 
second (1992) and third (1995) were temporary (that is, 2 and 1,5 years 
respectively before the completion of a four-year mandate), while the 
electoral legislation was amended four times, remaining intact only since 
the fourth election cycle (2000); 
• during the transitional period the number of houses in the Croatian Par-
liament changed; in the first mandate it consisted of three houses (like it 
did in the socialist system), in the second and third there were two, and 
since the fourth mandate there is only one house;  
• the number of representatives in the first house increased continually: 
from 80, through 138 and 127, to 151, 152 and 153 in the fourth to sixth 
mandate respectively3; 
• 34 out of over 100 registered political parties did as some point partici-
pate in the Croatian Parliament;  
 
2 Even though this tradition relies upon the existence of the Parliament as a form of political 
decision-making since the 16th century, neither then nor later, when it acquired the institutional 
form of a parliament, did it function in Croatia as an independent state, nor was it an autono-
mous political institution until 1990. Besides, the functioning of the Parliament was conditioned 
by the inclusion of Croatia in other state-political associations, which were not characterized by 
a democratic system or by democratic practice. This inexistence of political autonomy and de-
mocratic tradition indicates that prior to 1990 one can hardly speak of Croatian parliamentarism. 
3 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia stipulates that the Croatian Parliament may 
consist of no less than 100, and no more than 160 representatives.  
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• out of a total of 34 parliamentary parties, 13 had only one representative 
– more precisely, even if they managed to enter the Parliament more than 
once, they never had more than one representative; 
• half of the parliamentary parties (17) were part of the Parliament only 
once, while the other half consists of parties that appeared in at least two 
mandates (whether on the basis of electoral success or through non-
electoral parliamentarization); 
• 18 parties were represented in at least one legislative mandate thanks to 
non-electoral parliamentarization, and 8 of them lost their electoral par-
liamentary status in the course of the corresponding mandate;  
• out of a total of 18 parties that achieved parliamentary status through 
non-electoral parliamentarization, 10 achieved that status by forming 
new parties from fractions of parliamentary parties, and 8 by the crossing 
over of representatives from parliamentary to non-parliamentary parties; 
• out of a total of 18 parties that achieved parliamentary status through 
non-electoral parliamentarization, 7 managed to confirm that status in the 
following election cycle; 
• from 1990 the same party (HDZ) has permanently been the single strong-
est parliamentary party: in the first three mandates it held the absolute 
majority of mandates (68.8%, 61.6% and 59.1%), in the fourth – 30.5%, 
and in the fifth and sixth mandates it held 43.4% and 43.1% respec-
tively;4 
• SDP has been the second strongest party in the first (with 25% of the 
seats), fourth (29.8%), fifth (19.1%) and sixth (36.6%) mandates of the 
Parliament, while in the second and third mandates that place was held 
by HSLS (9.4% in each). 
 The above-mentioned indicators and the existing analyses of political and 
socio-structural characteristics and dynamics in the Croatian Parliament 
(Ilišin, 1999, 2001, 2007) point to several tendencies. Firstly, the nominal 
number of political parties which entered the Croatian Parliament on the ba-
sis of election results gradually increased. Secondly, the process of non-
electoral parliamentarization was more intense than the process of de-par-
liamentarization. Consequently, between one and five parties were added to 
 
4 Owing to the results of parliamentary elections, a minimal alternation of power is 
characteristic in Croatia. Specifically, HDZ held a monopoly of power in the first three assem-
blies, when it was able to form a government autonomously, while in the fifth and sixth assem-
blies it has been sharing power with coalition partners. The only period which this party spent in 
opposition was during the fourth legislative mandate, when the first coalition government in 
Croatia, led by SDP, was established.  
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the number of parties in the Parliament during each legislative mandate, ex-
cept the first one. Also, in terms of participation in non-electoral parliamen-
tarization, parties established through the fractioning of parliamentary par-
ties outnumbered those that entered the parliament through party crossovers 
of representatives (which indicates that extra-parliamentary parties were 
more attractive to “dissidents” from parliamentary parties than to the elec-
torate). Thirdly, the pronounced party fragmentation of the parliament in-
volved 7-15% of all representatives, which did not significantly influence 
the power relations based on election results. And finally, due to the fact that 
most parliamentary parties held a small number of seats, the changes within 
their ranks did not do anything either to endanger the parliamentary majori-
ties or the government. Thus, it can be concluded that the relatively high 
party fragmentation in the Croatian Parliament had no effect on its stability, 
nor did it significantly influence the social profiling of the parliamentary 
elite. At the same time, however, the unequal strength of parliamentary par-
ties resulted in a social structure of the Parliament which primarily depended 
on the social attributes of representatives of a small number of parties – in 
fact, two or three strongest parties.  
 Hence, in spite of the above-mentioned unfavorable conditions, the Croa-
tian Parliament functioned as a recruiter of the political elite, owing to the 
competitive elections, which inevitably force political elites to select candi-
dates beforehand, This is in fact a twofold process: first the selection of 
those aspiring to hold a seat in the parliament, and then the above-mentioned 
selection and training of parliament members for executive-power-related 
duties. After 18 years of existence of the multiparty parliament in Croatia, it 
is logical to assume that the recruitment patterns have been formed and that 
a socio-politically profiled parliamentary elite has been established, deter-
mining the social attributes and political competence of the parliamentary 
elite for conducting the process of democratic consolidation of the Croatian 
political system. According to the recent analytical insight, which ranked 
Croatia alongside the consolidated post-socialist countries (Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia), this 
task has been largely fulfilled. Still, it is noted that Croatia (similarly to Lat-
via, Bulgaria and Romania) needs more time for a complete democratic con-
solidation, and it must use it to overcome “problems such as corruption, or-
ganized crime and a weak judiciary” (Merkel, 2007: 18). This relativization 
of Croatia’s democratic consolidation stems from the insight that the “level 
of democratic consolidation does not entirely coincide with the quality of 
democratic regimes, although they strongly overlap” (Merkel, 2007: 16). All 
new democracies are characterized by a deficient legal state, although in a 
differentiated scope. To put it briefly, Croatia has covered a great part of the 
way towards a complete democratic consolidation. The political elite has 
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also played its part in this, and it is crucial to the continued processes of 
achieving the rule of law and the establishment of a quality democracy. 
 The subject of this paper is the Croatian parliamentary elite, and the 
analysis focuses on the socio-demographic and social attributes of the par-
liament members and their professional and political experience. These are 
in fact the personal characteristics of the elected members of the parliament 
that are used in the analysis of personnel in the representative bodies of 
power (Silk, 1987; Norton, 1990; Kavanagh, Jones, 1994; Olson, 1994; 
Butler, 1995; Norris, 1997; Adam/Tomšič, 2002). The established predomi-
nant attributes of parliamentarians are then observed as an indicator of the 
selection criteria used by political parties, while the repetition of dominant 
characteristics of the chosen candidates in several electoral cycles is inter-
preted as an established pattern of political recruitment. Thus, the goal of 
this analysis is to establish whether any recognizable patterns of political re-
cruitment into the Croatian parliamentary elite have been formed, and 
whether a socio-politically profiled parliamentary elite has been established 
after 18 years of existence and functioning of the multiparty Parliament. In 
order to achieve this, we have used a comparative analysis of a selection of 
social and political attributes of representatives in five parliamentary man-
dates from 1990 to 2003. 
 The empirical basis consists of secondary statistical data on the socio-
demographic and social attributes of representatives provided in special offi-
cial publications (Sabor Republike Hrvatske, 1992; Politički vodič, 1993, 
1995, 2000, 2004). To be more specific, only the so-called firm variables, 
determining the social profile of the representatives, are analyzed: gender, 
age, nationality and religious denomination, level and type of education, and 
previous professional and political experience. Previous professional experi-
ence is indicated by the type of occupation before the first election into the 
Parliament, while previous political experience is indicated by official duty 
in bodies of local and national government (including earlier mandates in the 
second house of the parliament) and in political parties.5 Another indicator 
 
5 In addition to a candidate’s function in a political party, the length of party service is also 
relevant for inclusion on the electoral lists, because it has already been demonstrated that long-
term and deserving members often obtain high positions in their party, which also gives them 
more internal influence (Silk, 1987; Michels, 1990; Butler, 1995). This, among other things, 
guarantees a higher influence on the formation of electoral lists, and a better personal position 
on them. In the sources used, no data was provided on the length of the representatives’ party 
service, but it would be justified to assume that it is closely related to the performance of party 
duties. In the case of Croatia, however, it should be noted that this correlation has been oscil-
lating due to the fractioning of most relevant parliamentary parties;  party founders and veterans 
have been seen to leave their parties (most often in order to found new ones), and their positions 
to be taken by previously unexposed, and even recently co-opted new members. The relatively 
frequent party fragmentations and the appearance of new parties result in a relatively short party 
service, which can, even in parties founded at the beginning of transition, come up to a maxi-
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of the latter is the number of present parliamentary mandates and years of 
parliamentary service. The used data relate to those representatives who con-
firmed their parliamentary status at the moment the observed legislative 
mandate of the Parliament was constituted. This means that there are certain 
deviations from the personnel situation as it would have been according the 
electoral lists, and from the actual situation at the end of the observed legis-
lative mandate. The first deviation is primarily caused by the fact that par-
ties, as a rule, put their strongest candidates on the electoral lists, many of 
which do not activate the obtained parliamentary status, but move directly to 
executive power in case their party won. Such personnel changes occurred in 
every legislative mandate and an average of 7% of representatives were con-
firmed substitutes to the elected candidates. The second deviation is a conse-
quence of leaving the Parliament during the mandate in order to perform 
other official duties, or due to illness or death. On the whole, personnel 
variations oscillate from 5 to 10% in one legislative mandate, which does not 
significantly affect the reliability of the established trends.   
 
The Socio-Demographic Attributes of the Croatian 
Parliamentary Elite 
 It is a well-known fact that parliaments in developed democracies do not 
represent the social structure of the society in which they operate, because 
they are traditionally dominated by middle-aged and highly educated men 
(Silk, 1987; Norton, 1990; Olson, 1994; Butler, 1995; Norris, 1997; 
Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998). Identical tendencies have been established in 
Croatia (Ilišin, 1999, 2001, 2007), and the following analysis will portray the 
exact trends. 
 In this section, we analyze representatives according to gender, age, na-
tionality and religious denomination. Graph 1 presents comparative data on 
the gender structure by party in the fifth mandate of the Parliament and 
overall indicators for the previous four mandates. 
 As a point of interest it should be emphasized that out of 34 parties repre-
sented in the Croatian Parliament since 1990, only 10 (29.4%) had at least 
one female representative in one of the mandates. It is important to note an 
increase in the share of women in the first four legislative mandates. In the 
fifth mandate it decreased a little, primarily due to the poorer electoral re-
 
mum of 18 years (except in the case of SDP, if it is treated as a successor of SKH). We can 
therefore assume that party service is presently a less reliable indicator of the patterns of politi-
cal recruitment of the Croatian parliamentary elite, than the performing of official duties in a 
party.  
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sults of the social democrats,6 but it still exceeds 20%. Apparently, the gen-
der equality policy, proclaimed in the early 2000s, has been at least partially 
realized in the party electoral lists, and visible in other bodies of authority.7 
Possibly the trend of increased representation of women in the Parliament 
will continue; on the one hand, this could be a consequence of a gender-sen-
sitive public policy and of what has been achieved so far, while on the other 
this could be a result of the fact that a stronger generation of young female 
politicians is active at the local level.8 
 
Graph 1: Gender structure of the Croatian Parliament in five mandates (%) 
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Women 3,8 5,8 7,9 22,5 21,1
Men 96,2 94,2 92,1 77,5 78,9
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003
 
 
 
6 As a modernist, socially regulative party with regard to the political participation of 
women (Leinert Novosel, 2001), SDP is the most inclined to promote female candidates. To be 
more specific, the share of female members equaled approximately one third of the party’s par-
liamentary representatives in all assemblies (except the first one, and including the sixth). 
7 In 2006, the representation of women in the Government of the Republic of Croatia was 
31%, and in the bodies of local authorities it ranged from 8 to 16% (Štimac Radin, 2007: 159). 
The first insights into the gender structure of the sixth legislative mandate of the Croatian Par-
liament indicate that the share of women has remained at the level of the previous (fifth) man-
date.  
8 The analysis of the gender structure of local authorities in Croatia (Ilišin, 2006: 26, 30) 
demonstrated that approximately 17% of all politicians at the local level were women, as op-
posed to 27% among young politicians. These young women could be an important pool for 
parties to choose from when composing lists for future parliamentary elections. 
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Table 1 shows the age structure of the Parliament, and the presented data 
verify the permanent dominance of middle-aged representatives. 
 
Table 1: Age structure of the Croatian Parliament in five mandates (%) 
Legislative mandate Age cohorts 
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
18-29 years of age –   1.5   1.6   2.0   2.0 
30-39 years of age 21.2 26.1 25.2 10.6   9.2 
40-49 years of age 41.2 27.5 26.0 50.3 47.4 
50-59 years of age 32.5 24.6 28.4 27.8 32.2 
60 and more years of age   5.1 20.3 18.8   9.3   9.3 
Average age (in years) 47 48 49 48 49 
 
 There is a permanent under-representation of parliamentarians under 30: 
their presence in the electorate is ten times higher than their presence in the 
parliament.9 The summarized data for all mandates of the Parliament, clearly 
show that the share of the oldest representatives has decreased (they are 
three times less represented in the last two mandates than in the electorate), 
and the share of members aged between 30 and 40 fared the same, but to a 
smaller degree. It is obvious that the share of representatives aged between 
40 and 60 increased on account of the above-mentioned decrease of age 
groups, and there were twice as many of them in the fourth and fifth man-
dates as there were in the electorate. The said changes stabilized the average 
age of representatives between 47 and 49.10 Since the local base of very 
young officials with some political experience has been multiply narrowed 
down,11 it is logical to assume that a possible larger penetration of youth into 
the Parliament will depend on the readiness of political parties to put their 
recent rhetoric into practice: instead of emphasizing the young as one of the 
most important resources for social development, they would have to place a 
 
9 The age structure of the electorate is as follows: under 29 – 20.6%; between 30 and 39 – 
17.6%; 40-49 – 19.2%; 50-59 – 15.2%; 60-69 – 14.8%; over 70 – 12.6% (Ilišin, 2003: 46). 
10 It is noteworthy that the age of representatives elected to the Parliament ranged from 22 
to 78. As for the parties, only the two largest had at least one representative under the age of 30: 
HDZ from the second to the fourth assemblies, and SDP in the second, fourth and fifth assem-
blies (Ilišin, 1999, 2001, 2007). 
11 In the representative and executive bodies of 21 counties and 123 cities in Croatia, about 
6% of the members are younger than 30. A comparison between the two strongest political par-
ties indicates that approximately 9% of SDP members are under 30, while in HDZ they take up 
approximately 6% (Ilišin, 2006: 33). 
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larger number of young persons on more prospective positions on the party 
lists.  
 The insight into the social attributes of the representatives is completed 
by indicators of nationality (Graph 2) and religious denomination (Table 2). 
 
Graph 2: National structure of the Croatian Parliament in five mandates (%) 
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* Bosnian, Czech, Hungarian, German, Ruthenian, Italian, Ukrainian, Jewish 
 
 It should be emphasized that the pronounced nationality-related homo-
geneity of the Croatian Parliament is congruent with that of the population. 
Namely, according to the latest census in Croatia, the share of Croats was 
approximately 90%, as opposed to 78% in the early 1990s (SLJH, 2002). It 
is quite obvious that the share of non-Croatian representatives in the Parlia-
ment could never reach the actual average of 7-8% if there was no guaran-
teed political representation of national minorities. It is indicative that, 
among the more influential parties, only the social democrats had members 
of other nationalities (primarily, Serbs) in every legislative mandate, while 
the structure of HDZ representatives was permanently uni-national – that is, 
Croatian (Ilišin, 1999, 2001, 2007).  
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Table 2: Religious denomination of Croatian Parliament members in five 
mandates (%) 
Legislative mandate Religious 
denomination 1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
Catholic 35.0 68.8 80.3 62.3 75.0 
Other denominations*   1.2   4.4   4.0   2.1   3.4 
Agnostics/Atheists   5.0 16.7 14.2 27.8 15.1 
Unknown 58.8 10.1   2.5   7.8   6.5 
* Among other denominations prevails the Orthodox, followed by the Muslim, 
Protestant and Jewish creeds.. 
 
 Insight into the representatives’ religious denomination is much more in-
teresting than the nationality-related data, primarily because in the first man-
date of the Parliament almost three fifths of the representatives refrained 
from specifying their denomination in the official biographic notes. But in 
the second legislative mandate we find a drastically altered situation, even 
though a certain number of representatives still believe the information to be 
private. The second point of interest is the share of atheists and agnostics 
among the representatives. It is 3-5 times higher than in the general popula-
tion, while the share of Roman Catholics is correspondingly smaller.12 This 
could partially be explained by the higher average level of education of the 
representatives, for all research into religiosity indicates that the share of re-
ligiously undecided or non-religious persons among the highly educated 
population is above average (Marinović Jerolimov, 2005). However, since 
with are dealing with the political elite here, their ideological and political 
convictions and their world-view presumably play a significant role.13 
 Briefly, the presented data indicate that, parallel with the re-traditionali-
zation of Croatian society and its transformation from a moderately hetero-
 
12 According to the 2001 census, 88% were Catholics, 7% were of other denominations, and 
5% were atheists and agnostics (SYRC, 2002). Such a distribution ranks Croatia among uni-
confessional societies, but it is markworthy that such a high religious homogenization is not ac-
companied by an equally strong religious practice, not to mention intensity of belief (Marinović 
Jerolimov, 2002, 2005). 
13 The data on the religious denomination of the representatives of some political parties in 
the fifth legislative mandate of the Parliament fully confirm this assertion (Ilišin, 2007: 72): all 
representatives of right-wing and right-center parties were of the same denomination, while all 
other parties and groups had members of other denominations in their ranks, as well as agnos-
tics and those that did not declare themselves. Again, the social democrats stood out, because 
two thirds of them stated that they were agnostics or atheists, which is in line with the classic 
ideological foundations of left-wing parties.  
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geneous and secular society into one that is distinctly homogenous with re-
gard to nationality and religious denomination, the same changes occurred in 
the Croatian Parliament. We may add that the changes were somewhat more 
pronounced as regards the nationality dimension. 
 
Educational and Professional Competences of the Members 
of Parliament 
 Neither the level nor the type of education or occupation are a prescribed 
precondition for being elected into the parliament or engaging in profes-
sional political activity. However, this is not to say that parties will not favor 
the more educated candidates, or the ones with adequate professional experi-
ence.14 Indeed, experience throughout the world indicates that these elements 
are very important in the selection of parliamentary candidates (Norton, 
1990; Kavanagh, Jones, 1994; Butler, 1995; Norris, 1997; Hague/Harrop/ 
Breslin, 1998). 
 As shown in Table 3, the educational structure of the Croatian parliament 
is congruent with that of most parliaments throughout the modern world, be-
cause most of its members are highly educated. 
 
Table 3: Level of education of Croatian Parliament members in five man-
dates (%) 
Legislative mandate Level of education 
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
Secondary school or less   3.8 10.1 12.6 12.6 15.8 
College education 10.0   5.8   4.7   5.3   5.9 
University education 62.5 60.1 56.7 55.6 55.9 
Master’s degree 12.5 12.3 11.0 10.6   7.2 
Ph.D. degree 11.3 11.6 15.0 15.9 15.1 
 
 
14 This does not necessarily imply that one’s entire professional career was realized in poli-
tics, all the more so considering that such politicians are still very rare in Croatia. Indeed, most 
Croatian politicians acquired their professional experience in occupations outside the political 
sphere. We should keep in mind, though, that the analysis of professional experience of parlia-
mentary members in established democracies indicated that specific professions and occupa-
tions are favored in the candidate-selection procedure (legal, economic, financial, managerial 
and other). This is demonstrated by the fact that these professionals are much more present 
among the parliamentarians than in the electorate (Kavanagh, Jones, 1994; Butler, 1995; Norris, 
1997). 
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 Still, comparative data points to a very gradual, but constant increase of 
representatives without a higher education degree – from less than 4% in the 
first legislative mandate, to 10% at a later point, while today one out of 
seven representatives has a high school diploma or (very rarely) less. At the 
same time, about a quarter of the representatives in all mandates have a 
master’s degree or a Ph.D., which makes the Parliament an institution with a 
distinct above-average share of persons with academic degrees, second only 
to scientific and higher-education institutions.15 Thus the Parliament, in spite 
of a very gradual decrease of highly educated representatives, remains a po-
litical institution permanently populated by highly qualified (indeed, over-
qualified) members. This is not a sufficient guarantee for professional and 
competent work of the representatives, but it is without a doubt a prerequi-
site worthy of respect. We must not fail to mention that previous analyses 
(Ilišin, 1999, 2001, 2007) indicated that the differences between parties were 
irrelevant, and only small oscillations were noted in the educational structure 
of all relevant parties. 
 
Table 4: Type of high education of Croatian Parliament members in five 
mandates (%) 
Legislative mandate Type of high education 
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
Natural and technical sciences 25.5 16.7 18.1 17.2 21.7 
Medical sciences 11.3   6.5   6.3   8.0   9.2 
Humanities and social sciences 24.2 30.6 29.1 30.5 27.0 
Economic sciences 14.5 10.1 15.0 13.9 11.2 
Legal sciences 20.8 25.9 18.9 17.2 15.1 
No high education   3.8 10.1 12.6 12.6 15.8 
 
15 The educational structure of the Parliament differs entirely and drastically from the 
educational structure of the Croatian population. The 2001 census data indicate (Ilišin, Mendeš, 
Potočnik, 2003: 62) that in the age cohort between 40 and 60 more than 15% are highly edu-
cated (including 2% with a master’s degree or a Ph.D.), which means that college education is 
six times more frequent among the members of parliament, and a scientific degree is 12 times 
more present than among their peers in the electorate. The thesis that higher education signifi-
cantly increases the chance to enter the electoral lists is verified by data regarding the educa-
tional structure of local authorities (Ilišin, 2006: 26). Namely, out of 4.125 local officials, 35.4% 
do not have more than a high school education, and the number of masters and doctors of sci-
ence is significantly lower than in the Parliament: approximately 5%. Still, the fact remains that 
even the education of local politicians is above average when compared to their electorate, 
which additionally confirms the importance of educational achievement for recruitment into the 
political elite at all levels.  
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 The data related to the type of the representatives’ high education is 
much more intriguing (Table 4), especially considering the fact that, in 
Croatia, empirically verifiable insights on this issue have been made avail-
able only recently (Budimir, 2007; Ilišin, 2007). 
 The data indicates a constant decrease in the share of lawyers, even 
though this is still the predominant individual profession, and the share of 
economists, as the second most common profession in the Parliament, goes 
through a similar process. The significant presence of lawyers coincides with 
the legislative function of the parliament. It is therefore to be expected that 
political parties try to engage a large number of lawyers in order to ensure 
adequate expert support for the transfer of their political will into legal 
regulations. On the other hand, economists are believed to be experts in 
budgetary policy, which is undoubtedly in direct connection with their rela-
tively more frequent candidature. Even though the share of experts from the 
fields of natural, technical and medical sciences is slowly increasing, the 
group of experts from the fields of social sciences and humanities is still 
prevalent. With the addition of lawyers and economists, the latter group ap-
pears to have had permanent majority: from 53% in the fifth mandate to 66% 
in the second mandate of the Parliament. If we take a look at the example of 
the fifth mandate, it is obvious that almost two thirds of the highly educated 
experts belong to the social sciences and humanities group (and even more 
than that in the previous mandates). We may assume that such a predomi-
nance of the said professions testifies to the well-known tendency of intel-
lectuals with a socially-oriented education to be more inclined towards social 
– including political – engagement,16 but it also characterizes the parties’ 
personnel policies.17 Most party leaders in Croatia belong to the group of in-
tellectuals with social science and humanistic education, and it would not be 
unfounded to assume that they believe a better understanding of social 
problems and processes might be expected from adequately educated rep-
 
16 This statement raises the issue of motivation for political engagement and competition for 
a position in the government, which is primarily a subject of political psychology. It should also 
be mentioned that motivation is linked to the doubt whether individuals are stimulated for in-
creased political engagement by the need for (self)actualization (connected with higher levels of 
self-esteem) or for compensation (connected with lower levels of self-esteem). Some less recent 
results in America (Carlson, Hyde, 1980) advocate the actualization hypothesis, and it would be 
interesting to research the phenomenon on a sample of Croatian politicians.  
17 A comparison between parties in the fifth legislative mandate of the Croatian Parliament 
indicated that “social intelligentsia” is especially protected by social democrats and liberal par-
ties, while “technocrats” can most often be found among the representatives of right-center par-
ties (Ilišin, 2007: 75). This means that Croatian political parties mostly share another common 
characteristic with similar parties throughout the world – a predominance of intellectuals from a 
social science/humanities provenance in the left segment of the political spectrum, and a pre-
dominance of entrepreneurs and technical experts in the right segment (Norton, 1990; Madg-
wick, 1994; Butler, 1995; Hague/Harrop/Breslin, 1998). 
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resentatives. This, of course, does not mean that experts in technical, medi-
cal and natural sciences – and withal those “social scientists” whose ac-
quired knowledge has nothing or very little to do with competencies neces-
sary for engagement in political affairs – could not make up for potential 
deficits in the type of required knowledge through devoted work (e.g. 
through thorough studying of materials and use of services of adequate ex-
perts). Still, it is logical to presume that they experience more frequently the 
lack of elementary knowledge necessary for competent participation in dis-
cussions and for a convincing articulation of arguments aimed at the promo-
tion of their own other initiatives and proposals, or at challenging those put 
forward by others. 
 There is no doubt that information on the representatives’ occupation 
prior to their first election to the Parliament can advance considerably the 
detection of their potential competence. The data provided in Table 5 indi-
cate that no significant changes took place during the five legislative man-
dates. 
 
Table 5: Occupation of Parliament members before their first election to the 
Croatian Parliament in five mandates (%) 
Legislative mandate Previous occupation 
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
Professional political or 
administrative position 8.7 32.6 30.8 39.7 40.2 
Educational, cultural and 
media-related professions 18.8 22.4 26.7 23.1 20.3 
Managers, entrepreneurs 
and craftsmen 26.1 27.5 30.7 22.5 27.7 
Agricultural workers   1.2   3.6   4.0   4.6   3.3 
Retired persons –   5.1   3.9   2.0   5.3 
Unknown and other 45.0 8.7   3.9   8.7   3.3 
 
 A constant (though very gradual) increase is visible in the share of repre-
sentatives who performed an executive or political function as professionals, 
while the indicators for other occupations vary, although not significantly.18 
Most representatives had been professional politicians, managers and entre-
preneurs, next in line are educational, cultural and similar professions, while 
 
18 The data for the first legislative mandate is unreliable simply because it is incomplete. It 
was the same as with religious self-identification – no information about occupation was pro-
vided in the official publication. 
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manual workers, farmers and retired persons are the least present. It is there-
fore obvious that previous executive experience acquired in politics or econ-
omy is important, because it increased from three fifths in the second man-
date to two thirds in the fifth legislative mandate. If we compare this to the 
previously interpreted indicators of change in the number of highly educated 
representatives and the specific types of high education, it would seem that 
executive experience compensates for a certain deficit in particular expert 
knowledge. 
 
Overall and Parliamentary Political Experience of the 
Members of Parliament 
 Political experience prior to the first election into the Parliament (which 
could be both professional and volunteer) contributes to a parliamentary 
candidate’s qualifications even more than previous professional experience. 
Since the establishment of patterns of recruitment into the political elite in a 
multiparty system has started no sooner than in 1990,19 the significant 
changes which took place during the five legislative mandates were abso-
lutely expected (Table 6). 
 A general change is visible in the consistent decrease of the number of 
representatives entering the Parliament without any political experience, 
which implies that the Parliament is becoming inaccessible to so-called po-
litical amateurs. At the same time, the greatest changes are connected with 
the constant increase of the number of representatives with previous experi-
ence in performing political duties in local governments, especially in politi-
cal parties. Indeed, it is obvious that party engagement is the most important 
channel for political advancement to the national level. This is not surprising 
 
19 There is no systematized official information about a possible political experience ac-
quired in the socialist system, and the public is familiar only with the biographies of the most 
distinguished active politicians. The gathering of this data is obstructed by the tendency of nu-
merous Croatian politicians to “embellish” their past and omit potentially compromising facts. 
Even if they publicly admit their previous membership in the Communist Party, this is most of-
ten motivated by their efforts to portray themselves as victims of the former regime. More often 
than not, they resort to the justification that they did not become dissidents with the sole pur-
pose of striving to “undermine the hated regime from the inside”. Still, the data made available 
by an empirical research into the social structure of the Croatian society conducted in 1996 in-
dicate that 51% of the politicians surveyed (at the national and local levels) were members of 
the Communist Party (Hodžić, 2002.), and it is very likely that the percentage is higher. Infor-
mation about performing an official duty in the bodies of government in socialist Croatia or 
Yugoslavia is even more inaccessible, and we are only safe in stating that such cases were 
fewer, because membership in the Communist Party was far more comprehensive than partici-
pation in government. In any case, it is certain that the share of politicians with a communist 
past, i.e. with experience acquired in the totalitarian system, will decrease in keeping with the 
tempo and scope of the generational shift in politics. 
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if we keep in mind, as mentioned in the introduction, that parties (more pre-
cisely, party elites) are the principal selectors. When drawing up electoral 
lists, the list-makers estimate the ability of potential candidates to act in ac-
cordance with party interests and to respect the leader’s authority, as well as 
the candidate’s party merits and intra-party position (i.e., power). Subse-
quently, they probably take into consideration other qualities as well, such as 
previous administrative experience, and the level and type of education or 
professional achievement.20 Political experience acquired through work in 
the Government and its bodies or in the second house of the Parliament 
(abolished in 2001) appears to be less relevant simply because there are 
much more local authority units, and accordingly the opportunities for a per-
son to acquire political experience there are much higher. Previous political 
experience is therefore an important component of the representatives’ po-
litical competence,21 but in addition to that, it is a criterion for selection in 
the parliamentary elite recruitment process. It should be added that. as a rule, 
the leaders of parliamentary parties (with the exception of the electoral win-
ners, who usually move on to executive power) also become Parliament 
members, which turns this institution into a sort of pool for party elites. 
 An important prerequisite for the formation of parliamentary elite is the 
stability of the institution and of the representatives’ mandates. This has to 
do with the assumption that early election (which objectively shorten the du-
ration of the mandate) and a constant influx of new members noticeably hin-
der and slow down the formation of a sufficiently large group of career par-
liamentarians. The above assumption relies on the thesis that only a high rate 
of reelection of representatives, i.e. a low fluctuation rate, ensures the for-
mation of a professional parliamentary elite. The Croatian Parliament still 
 
20 In the five assemblies observed, not one representative from an independent list was 
elected to the Parliament, while some representatives of national minorities (from the second 
legislative mandate on) were elected as independent candidates. When parties decide to put on 
their electoral lists a non-party candidate, they are sure to be guided by his/her professional 
reputation. In the fourth and fifth assemblies, a total of seven independent representatives man-
aged to enter the Parliament through four party lists (one representative achieved it twice, on 
lists of different parties). Some of these representatives became completely independent in the 
parliament, having left the party clubs whose lists they were elected from, some joined the party 
that gave them the opportunity, while the smallest number of them preserved their independent 
status.  
21 We have already mentioned that the parliamentary representatives are also trained for ex-
ecutive duties. This occurs in Croatia as well: 52% of Government members in 2000, and 47% 
in 2003 had 4-9 years of previous parliamentary service. The other members of these govern-
ments had previous political experience as county heads, mayors and members of representative 
and executive bodies at the local level or in different bodies of the Government.  
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does not guarantee the fulfillment of these preconditions,22 as indicated by 
the data in Table 7. 
 
Table 6: Political duties of Parliament members before their first election to 
the Croatian Parliament in five mandates* (%) 
Legislative mandate Previous political 
duty 1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
Local government   1.3 15.2 21.3 27.8 38.8 
Political party 25.0 56.5 63.0 70.9 75.0 
Government and 
governmental bodies – 11.6   9.4   9.9   5.9 
Second house of the 
Parliament   1.3 20.3 10.2 11.9   7.9 
Without previous 
political duty 75.0 24.6 22.8 23.2 15.1 
* The sum of duties normally exceeds 100% because the representatives could 
simultaneously perform several political duties (in parties and governmental bodies). 
 
Table 7: Parliamentary experience of Croatian Parliament members in five 
mandates (%) 
Legislative mandate Mandate 
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 
First 100.0 66.7 50.4 66.2 59.9 
Second – 33.3 33.9 18.5 25.0 
Third – – 15.7 11.3   9.2 
Fourth – – –   4.0   4.6 
Fifth – – – –   1.3 
Average number of 
mandates   1.0   1.1   1.5   1.4   1.6 
Average parliamen-
tary service (in years)   2.4   3.6   5.7   5.5   6.1 
 
 
 
22 In developed democracies the percentage of reelected parliament members ranges from 
60% to 85%, and the average duration of parliamentary service is 6-20 years (Hague/Harrop/ 
Breslin, 1998: 197). 
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 The percentage of reelected representatives was greatest in the third leg-
islative mandate of the Parliament (49.6%), and in other mandates (not 
counting, of course, the first one) it ranged from 33 to 40%.23 As a result of 
the relatively high fluctuation of representatives, at the end of the fifth leg-
islative mandate the average duration of parliamentary service was a little 
over six years. Due to the continuous increase of the number of parliamen-
tary members, and to the early elections held in 1992 and 1995, the average 
duration of a parliamentary career increased very gradually, while the in-
crease in the average number of mandates accelerated to some extent. If we 
take into consideration the Croatian Parliament in general from the first to 
the end of the fifth legislative mandate, the average number of mandates is 
1.424 and the average duration of parliamentary service is five years.25 Con-
sequently, less than 20% of representatives in the fifth legislative mandate of 
the Parliament could be referred to as parliamentary veterans (being in their 
third, fourth or fifth legislative mandate), which means that the so-called 
steady core of experienced parliamentarians in the Croatian Parliament is too 
small to have a noticeable influence on the institution’s style of work (Ilišin, 
2007).  
 
 
23 In the current, sixth mandate of the Croatian Parliament, 42.5% of reelected representa-
tives confirmed their mandate at the constitutive sitting (in early January 2008), which means 
that the predominance of new-coming representatives continues. The share of 57.5% of repre-
sentatives elected for the first time would assuredly be much smaller if not for the considerable 
changes in personnel with regard to the electoral lists. Namely, approximately 20% of the 
elected candidates did not activate their representative mandate, and substitute candidates en-
tered the Parliament instead, among which almost no one has previous parliamentary experi-
ence.  
24 The average number of mandates was obtained by dividing 648 representative seats with 
477 representatives, which is their total number. It should also be said that the large fluctuation 
is connected with the failure to reenter the parliament after a skipped election cycle. This is at-
tested to by the fact that only two representatives in the fifth mandate managed to return to the 
Parliament after they interrupted their parliamentary career (we left out of consideration those 
who did not activate their mandates, e.g. due to their direct transfer to the executive branch). In-
deed, an interruption of the parliamentary career is most often caused by a representative’s per-
sonal decision to withdraw from politics or by the electoral-list-makers’ decision not to put 
him/her in a (potentially winning) position on the list, rather than by a party’s electoral defeat 
(except in such cases where there was a great change in the will of the electorate compared to 
the previous election cycle). The average duration of parliamentary service was calculated at the 
end of an observed legislative mandate. 
25 For the rare representatives who were not Parliament members before 2001, but were 
members of another house of the Parliament (Municipality Council, Associated Work Council, 
County House), those mandates were not calculated into the total number of mandates and the 
duration of parliamentary service, because this analysis is based on data regarding the first 
house of the Parliament (before the Parliament became unicameral in 2001).  
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Concluding Overview 
 Even though Croatia has reached the upper part of the scale of success in 
democratic consolidation for post-socialist countries, it is indisputable that 
this process has been uneven due to certain specific socio-historic, social and 
political circumstances. The same is true of the development of parliamenta-
rism: the democratic deficits from the first decade of the newly-established 
democratic order influence the inadequate functioning of the Parliament and 
the decelerated formation of parliamentary elite. 
 In the critical and constitutive period of the early 1990s, the Parliament 
enjoyed a relatively high reputation in the collective consciousness of the 
citizens and was expected to play a major role in the political life of the 
country – partly due to its symbolic meaning throughout history – but rela-
tively quickly it was degraded into a marginalized institution. The executive 
power dominated the system: until the end of 1999, in the person of the au-
thoritarian president of the state, and after his death and the abolishment of 
the semi-presidential system, through the government. The parliamentary 
representatives themselves contributed to the decrease in the institution’s 
reputation, with their limited competence, their subordination to party lead-
ers and leaderships, their insufficient respect for internal democratic proce-
dures, and their frequent concern with political disagreements instead of key 
social problems... In this situation, the reputation of the parliamentary elite 
was and still is on permanent probation in the eyes of the public. 
 Aside from the above-mentioned subjective deficiencies, the frequent 
fractioning of parliamentary parties, and the incessant renewal of the process 
of non-electoral parliamentarization, the Croatian Parliament was also vul-
nerable to external influence. The frequent alterations of electoral regula-
tions and models, the great electoral dynamic, and the changes of the politi-
cal will of the electorate all contributed to its instability, which is reflected in 
the high fluctuation of representatives. Still, after three peaceful changes of 
power and after the establishment of a moderately pluralistic party system, it 
can be said that the destabilizing influence of external factors on further par-
liamentary development has been partly annulled through the process of de-
mocratic consolidation, which means that all preconditions are met for the 
formation of a more stable parliamentary elite. 
 We have indicated the socio-political profile of the Croatian parliamen-
tary elite by analyzing the predominant attributes of representatives in five 
mandates of the Croatian Parliament. We have established that the 18 years 
of a multiparty system resulted in the formation of a parliamentary elite with 
a recognizable socio-political profile, consisting predominantly of men (even 
though the representation of women tends to increase), averagely between 
47 to 49 years of age, Croats, Catholics, highly educated, primarily in the 
field of social sciences and humanities, with significant previous executive 
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and political experience (acquired mostly in political parties) and with five 
years of parliamentary service. Based on these indicators, we can also claim 
that, in Croatia, the patterns of political recruitment into the parliamentary 
elite are congruent with those existing in established democratic systems. 
 The predominant characteristics of the social structure of the Croatian 
Parliament did not change significantly with time. With regard to most of the 
observed attributes, we find a relatively weak differentiation of representa-
tives who entered the Parliament in different electoral cycles and from dif-
ferent party electoral lists, which points to a significant homogenization of 
the parliamentary elite. We can therefore conclude that the personnel poli-
cies of various political parties as principal selectors are largely similar, 
which is especially pointed out by the stable predominance of highly edu-
cated representatives, and by the great, and increasing, significance of politi-
cal experience acquired in one of the leading positions in the parties them-
selves. 
 In spite of the observed weaknesses, the Croatian Parliament was for the 
most part successful in performing its recruitment and socialization role 
during the entire transitional period. Firstly, the number of local politicians 
entering the Parliament gradually increased, and they managed to arise as the 
most important recruitment resource, thus receiving an opportunity for af-
firmation at the national level. Secondly, the executive power personnel was 
recruited from the lines of parliamentary representatives: parliamentarians 
were appointed prime ministers and ministers, they filled the available seats 
in governmental bodies, in public companies and embassies, and even be-
came judges of the Constitutional Court. Thirdly, an initial core of experi-
enced parliamentarians was formed, which was expected to competently dis-
cuss and decide upon all the important issues of national policy, and at least 
attempt to resist the immoderate expansion of the reach of executive power. 
Fourthly, the Parliament has probably been least efficient in regard to the 
mobilization and socialization of citizens, which could be improved through 
an increase in the number of experienced or politically more competent, tol-
erant and articulated representatives. 
 There is one more circumstance, however, which obstructs the represen-
tatives’ efforts to operate responsibly, namely, a pronounced partitocracy in 
the situation when most Croatian political parties suffer from a lack of intra-
party democracy. Since parties are not only key protagonists in the political 
arena, but also primary selectors of parliamentary candidates, their power 
could be partially limited by none other than those of their members who 
have already attained a high reputation in the Parliament and the wider pub-
lic. This also means that only the truly competent and politically credible 
representatives can speak at the parliamentary rostrum as protagonists of 
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democratic discussion and decision-making, and not simply as exponents of 
their parties and narrow party interests. 
Translated by  
Ivona Mendeš 
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